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We assess the efficiency of urban water supply in 27 Indian cities using data 
envelopment analysis (DEA).  We also group cities by the management structure of 
their water utilities.  Utilities with greater degree of functional autonomy perform 
better, supporting the hypothesis that more autonomy in management leads to better 
performance among water utilities.  Our results also have implications for urban 
domestic water pricing--most of the utilities operate under decreasing returns to 
scale (DRS) implying water should be priced at marginal cost of supply. 
 
 




                                                 
*     Department of Economics, University of Delhi (corresponding author): sgupta@econdse.org). 
**   Department of Business Economics, University of Delhi: surender672@gmail.com 
*** TERI University, New Delhi: gopalkrishna.sarangi@gmail.com 1 
 
DOES GREATER AUTONOMY IMPROVE PERFORMANCE? 
EVIDENCE FROM WATER SERVICE PROVIDERS IN INDIAN CITIES 
 




I.  Introduction 
 
Provision of adequate water supply to a growing urban population is a daunting task 
worldwide (Schuringa, 2006, Nallathiga, 2006). This assumes greater significance in 
the context of India due to its implications for economic growth, productivity, and 
poverty reduction (Mathur and Thakur, 2003). It is estimated that by 2025, 50 
percent of Indians will reside in urban areas (India Assessment, 2002). Given this 
growth of urban population coupled with increasing usage of water due to increasing 
incomes, and declining water quality because of groundwater contamination and 
surface water pollution, water problems might aggravate in almost all urban 
conurbations in India.  Recognizing the importance of the water sector, the emphasis 
should be on improving performance through reforming the management institutions, 
policies, and planning systems (World Bank, 2002). Therefore, it reasons, to look at 
the existing structure and functions of urban water supply system and to examine 
the level of performance of water utilities in India.  
 
Water supply system in urban India suffers from multiple problems. There is gross 
mismanagement of water supply system in urban India (Singhal and Johri, 2002; 
Kundu and Thakur, 2006). The predominant problems confronted by the urban water 
supply system are intermittent and irregular water provisions, inefficient and 
inequitable allocation of resources, low tariffs, high level of fiscal dependence, poor 
management of consumer concerns and high coping costs (MoUD & PA, 2004). It is 
riddled with the problems of O & M, low water pressure, ill-designed transmission 
and distribution system, poor water quality, unequal distribution within the city, and 
high unaccounted for water (Pangare et al., 2004; TERI, 2010) resulting high 
financial and health costs (McKenzie and Ray, 2009). Considering the above facts, it 
necessitates examining the strengths and weaknesses of urban local bodies 
providing water by using the performance measurement approaches to direct them 
to perform efficiently.  
 
The need for performance measurement of cities is well documented (Ammons, 
1996, Osborne and Gaebler, 1993, Wood, 1998). Performance measurement can be 
defined as a technique to determine how effectively and efficiently an urban local 
body delivers the required service. It examines both quantitative and qualitative 
aspects of an agency’s functioning. Moreover, it establishes a connection between 
policy options and their outcomes. The use of this technique is not new for water 
utilities and several countries have adopted it to improve the performance of their 
utilities. The inherent characteristic of serving as an effective incentive mechanism 
makes the performance measurement technique an appealing instrument. Typically, 
researchers employ two different types of performance benchmarking techniques. 2 
One is average analysis or simple ratio measures
1, sometimes known as the partial 
productivity index and the other that takes into account all the inputs used and 
outputs produced by the utilities, is called total factor productivity (TFP) measures. 
The latter are based on either regression analysis (RA) or data envelopment analysis 
(DEA) techniques. 
 
This study uses output-oriented DEA approach to estimate the relative efficiency of 
27 Indian cities in the provision of water services for the year 2004-05.  Given the 
existing distortions in the availability of cost data, it is reasonable to employ DEA 
which is less demanding on information. Further, use of the technique of regression 
requires prior knowledge of the functional form, whereas DEA does not require such 
kind of assumptions regarding the specifications of production technology. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section II describes the existing urban 
water supply situation and the inherent problems associated with it. Section III 
reviews some select literature analyzing the efficiency of the water sector. The focus 
here is to review literature analyzing the effect of ownership on performance on a 
comparative basis. Section IV elaborates the methodology adopted and the 
estimation technique followed.  Section V describes the data. Section VI spells out 
the results derived from the study and the final section concludes. 
 
 
II. Some Stylised Facts of Urban Water Supply in India 
 
The responsibility of supplying water in urban India is vested with sub national 
governments.  While the Central Government formulates overall policies for the 
development of the water sector in urban areas, State Governments lay down 
detailed policies and set up institutions for the proper development and management 
of water systems in these areas. 
 
The institutional setting for providing water in urban areas varies from state to state. 
State level Public Health Engineering Departments (PHEDs), specialised statewide 
water supply and sewerage boards (WSSBs), specialised city-level WSSBs, and 
Municipal Corporations (MCs) and urban local bodies, are the leading providers of 
water in urban India.  Apart from these, some other bodies such as various Ministries 
and Departments, financial institutions, external support agencies, NGOs, and 
private sectors also play direct and indirect role in water supply.  
 
We provide a brief description of the situation for key indicators of the water supply 
system on a comparative basis for selected cities
2.  Data was collected for a cross 
section of 27 Indian cities for different variables. The principal data source for our 
study is City Development Plans (CDPs) available online at the website of the 
Ministry of Urban Development, Government of India. These CDPs give information 
                                                 
1 Ratio estimates are frequently used in partial productivity measures where ratio of output to input 
gives partial idea about the efficiency of a sector. For instance lpcd (litre per capita per day) is a ratio 
of quantity of water to population figure, describing the per capita availability of water, irrespective of 
the use of resources. 
 
2 The selection of cities from the 63 cities covered by the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal 
Mission (JNNURM) was constrained by availability of data. 3 
on various dimensions of water supply system in different urban units of India. The 
comparison is done for the variables such as litres per capita per day (lpcd) of water 
supply, water connections per thousand population, per capita revenue 
expenditures, hours of water supply, percentage of population served, etc. 
 
Litres per capita per day (lpcd) of water supply 
 
This gives an idea of the quantum of water availability.  It is calculated on the basis 
of present population of the city. The National Drinking Water Mission (NDWM) in the 
late 1980’s fixed 140 lpcd as the norm.  Half of the cities are far below from the 
prescribed norm. Average lpcd of water supply is lowest in Guwahati (41.23 lpcd) 
and highest in Chandigarh (about 8 times that of Guwahati).  Although the average 
for our sample is 156 lpcd, there is wide variation across cities (Figure 1). The 
existing variations can be attributed both to the quantum of water available in a city 
and total population of the city. It must be cautioned here that the lpcd figures quoted 
in CDPs do not consider water sourced from individual and municipal bore wells 
being operational in many cities. Therefore, the lpcd figures may be considered as 





Water connections per 1000 population 
 
A comparative assessment of the data for 23 cities for water connections shows that 
the connection per 1000 people is highest in Vadodara i.e. 185.4 and lowest in 
Greater Mumbai i.e. 29.35. The low figures for Mumbai are probably due to two 
reasons.  One, related to the demographic characteristics of Mumbai, i.e., it is one of 
the most densely populated metropolises in India and second, the high slum 
population of the city.  Again, there exist significant variations across cities. It is 
doubtful whether the water connection figures ensure that water is available to the 








Annual per capita revenue expenditure 
 
Revenue expenditure comprises expenditures made on operation and maintenance 
(O and M) of the utilities, establishment costs, and debt servicing, etc. Annual per 
capita revenue expenditure is calculated by dividing the total revenue expenditure 
figures with the figure of the population served by utilities. An analysis of 27 cities 
exhibits that the annual per capita revenue expenditure is highest in the Itanagar i.e. 
Rs. 1219.18 followed by Hyderabad (Rs. 556.58) and Chandigarh (Rs. 511.47), and 
lowest in Surat (Rs. 11.60). The mean annual per capita revenue expenditure is Rs. 
185. Though annual revenue expenditure does not completely reflect the status of 
the water supply utilities in cities. But given the data constraints, annual revenue 
expenditure, at its minimum gives a rough idea about the financial status of the water 









Water availability (hours/day) 
 
This indicates the average hours of water supply from the public system in a city.  
Available data for 23 urban localities reflects that Ludhiana fares well and the public 
water system in Ludhiana supplies water for about 12 hours in a day followed by 
Chandigarh. On the other hand, water supply in cities like Rajkot, Visakhapatnam, 
Indore and Vadodara is very poor ranging from 30 minutes to 45 minutes per day. 
(even though it appears a bit contradictory when lpcd figures of Rajkot and 
Visakhapatnam are compared and contrasted with mean hours of water supply 
figures for the respective cities).  A possible reason for such an inconsistent picture 
may be overstating of lpcd figures.  The average hour of water supply among all 
cities is 3.7 hours. If we compare these figures with the figures of some cities of 
Asian countries, we find that almost all Indian cities analysed here perform very 
badly.  For example, cities like Singapore, Hong Kong, Seoul, and Kuala Lumpur 






Percentage of population served  
 
This measure indicates the proportion of the population in the service area that 
receives water from the public water system.  The ratio between the total population 
of the city and the population served by the public water system gives us the 
indicator of ‘percentage of population served’. 
 
Calculations for 27 cities reveals that almost all people are served by the water 
supply system in Chandigarh, Madurai, Rajkot, and Greater Mumbai in contrast to 
cities like Vijayawada, Visakhapatnam, and Guwahati, where public water supply 
system could manage to serve only about 30 percent of total population of the city.  It 
must be cautioned here that, while examining the appropriateness of this indicator as 
a measure of the effectiveness of the water supply system, one must keep in mind 
that the dramatic growth of population in almost all the urban localities distorts the 





The above description of some select cities illustrates the physical dimensions of the 
water supply situation in urban India. Apart from these concerns, there exist 
considerable problems of governance in water supply system in urban localities in 
India in terms of lack of transparency and accountability in the functioning, resulting 
in poor level of performance (WSP, 2006). The unhealthy water supply problem in 
urban India is because of poor cost recovery, tariffs not reflective of cost of service, 
inappropriately targeted and ill-defined subsidies, and inadequate investments 
(World Bank, 1999). A brief account is given here on some dimensions of the 
existing problems in the provision of water in urban India. 
 
Unviable pricing policy: Poor pricing policy fails to provide the required incentives 
to improve the system both technically as well as institutionally (Mathur and Thakur, 
2003). Present prices do not cover even half of the operation and maintenance 
(O&M) costs in case of urban water and the continuation of subsidies does not have 
any rationale since they do not benefit the targeted poor (Reddy and Mahendra Dev, 
2006). Rather, these subsidies encourage inefficiency in water use and threaten the 
sustainable supply of water (TERI, 1995). Thus, the revenue generated from user 
charges falls short of the expenditure made for it. As a consequence of which assets 
deteriorate and puts question mark on the financial sustainability of the services. 
Further, the financial sustainability is hindered by the existence of low level of 
financial management and accounting system, high capital and O&M costs, 
overstaffing and very high level of non-revenue water, existence of high level of 
subsidies and single entry cash-based accounting system having insufficient 
information to make the system transparent. 
 
Managerial inefficiency: It is argued that the deficiency in the availability of water in 
urban conglomerations is due to the existence of weak managerial capacity (Kundu 
and Thakur, 2006). The spectrum of skills and expertise that are required to 
undertake the managerial challenges do not seem to be present in many of the 
urban local bodies in India (NIUA, 1998). The management structures are not 
unified, reflecting lack of coherence in the decision making process. 
  
Poor institutional set-up: The institutional set up of the water and sanitation sector 
of urban India is characterised by the non-existence of effective regulator, lack of 
controls and co-ordination between the concerned agencies. Existence of multiple 7 
institutions and lack of co-ordination among them results in ambiguous and unclear 
responsibilities (Singhal and Johri, 2002) 
 
Simply listing down the problems of urban water supply in India is not enough and 
the need of the hour is to find an appropriate solution which is Pareto improving. To 
find such a solution with the existing resource constraint, first it becomes necessary 
to measure the extent of inefficiency, i.e., how much service quality can be improved 
by making better use of the existing inputs. It is also a hard fact that all the utilities 
are not equally inefficient; some may be more inefficient in comparison to their peers. 
We also know that in India, different bodies, such as PHED of state governments, 
Municipal Corporations and Parastatals
3 manage the urban water supply. Therefore, 
the present study first tries to measure the extents of technical inefficiency of urban 
water supply bodies of selected cities and then try to relate to the performance of 
these bodies to their management structure. 
 
 
III. Review of Recent Literature 
 
The debate on ownership and its linkage with efficiency in water sector originated 
with the seminal paper by Crain and Zardkoohi (1978). They assessed the relative 
efficiency of public versus private water utilities in the United States with the use of a 
log linear cost function derived from a generalised Cobb-Douglas production 
function.  For the estimation of the cost function, labour and capital were taken as 
two input variables and a dummy was incorporated to examine the effects of 
ownership on the efficiency of the sector.  The paper concludes that publicly owned 
utilities had higher costs and lower labour output elasticity in comparison to their 
private counterparts.  Though this paper initiated the debate of measuring the 
comparative efficiency of public versus private ownership, it is not without criticism.  
The assumption of homogeneous output appears to be inappropriate and non-
inclusion of opportunity cost of capital sounds illogical in a sector like water where 
capital costs constitute significant portion of the total cost.  
 
Similarly, Bruggink (1982) carried out an analysis of measuring the relative efficiency 
of the public versus private ownership in water utilities and concludes that private 
operators are relatively better to others. However, based on a variation of the Chow 
test, he finds that ownership does not have any significant effect on the structure of 
the cost or underlying production functions. 
 
Feigenbaum and Teeples (1983) criticise Crain and Zardkoohi (1978) and Bruggink 
(1982) on methodological grounds. They approached the problem from a different 
perspective with the use of a hedonic cost function technique. They conclude that 
there is a little difference in the performance levels between the private operators 
and public operators. Non-inclusion of capital costs in Feigenbaum and Teeples 
(1983) model was also criticised (Coelli and Walding, 2005). A further contribution to 
this debate was by Teeples and Glyer (1987).  Using data for water utilities in 
California they analysed and compared earlier studies by Crain and Zardkoohi 
(1978), Bruggink (1982) and Feigenbaum and Teeples (1983) and came to the 
                                                 
3 Parastatal bodies are part of the government with some degree of functional autonomy, e.g., the 
Delhi Jal Board (DJB). 8 
conclusion that differing results in these earlier studies were due to existing model 
restrictions implicit in the all of the studies. 
 
Byrnes et al. (1986) attempted to assess the relative efficiency of private versus 
public ownership in water utilities with the use of linear programming technique of 
DEA. They specified the production model with single output variable, volume of 
water delivered and seven input variables: ground water, surface water, purchased 
water, part time labour, full time labour, length of pipe line and storage capacity. The 
authors find that there is not much difference in the technical efficiency scores of 
private versus public firms.  
 
Lambert and Dichev (1993) also carried out a comparative assessment of the 
performance of private versus public water utilities. DEA technique was used to 
calculate the efficiency scores for 238 public and 32 private firms. The data were 
taken from American Water Works Association (AWWA). The study concludes that 
the major source of inefficiency is the technical inefficiency. There exists little 
difference between performance of private and public firms. 
 
Estache and Kouassi, (2002) attempted to figure out the determinants of efficiency 
levels achieved by 21 African water utilities. The results show that corruption is 
negatively linked to efficiency while governance is positively associated with 
efficiency. Analysing the effects of privatization, they found that, the privatization 
does have an impact on the performance of the water utilities. This is in contrasts to 
the study carried out by the Estache and Rossi (2002) for Asia, where they 
concluded that there is no significant difference between the private and public 
operators. 
 
Kirkpatrick et al. (2006) also addresses the issue of ownership and its effect on 
performance of the sector. This study examines the effects of privatization on the 
performance of the sector using data of African water utilities. Both the SFA and 
DEA techniques are used for the analysis. The result shows that there is not much 
difference in the performance between the privately owned utilities and publicly 
owned utilities.  
 
Despite the existing inefficiency concerns in the urban water supply situation in India, 
to our surprise there is a dearth of literature in examining this aspect with the use of 
techniques like RA and DEA, except two studies authored by one of us (Kumar, 
2010; Kumar and Managi, 2010). Earlier attempts to examine the issues of (in) 
efficiency in the supply of urban water were confined mostly using some partial 
productivity measurement methods (Singhal and Johri, 2002; WSP, 2006).  
 
Singhal and Johri (2002) in their paper point out the existing deficiencies in the water 
supply management system in urban India and suggest the use of performance 
management indicators to improve the deteriorating water management system. 
 
WSP (2006) develops some performance indicators using ratio methods to measure 
the efficiency of water supply systems in some select urban localities. Performance 
data was collected for 13 utilities covering 23 cities and towns across India. The 
indicators chosen were investment, financial, billing and collection, quality, costs and 
staffing, network, metering, unaccounted for water (UFW), production/consumption, 9 
coverage etc. A detailed analysis was carried out within the sample to elicit the 
performance levels among cities. Further, overall sample average was also 
compared with international benchmarks. WSP (2006), in a similar fashion to the 
other study (e.g., Singhal and Johri (2002), applies ratio methods to evaluate the 
cities in terms of their ability to supply water. From methodological point of view it 
can be argued that the use of ratio methods is incapable to reflect the true 
performance of the utilities.  
 
Studies by Kumar (2010) and Kumar and Managi (2010) use a similar set of data 
gathered from an ADB survey of Indian water utilities in 2005. One of the studies 
(Kumar, 2010) measures the performance of 20 urban utilities by making use of 
directional distance function as an analytical tool. It suggests that at the mean level, 
Indian water utilities have the potential of increasing water delivery levels and 
reducing unaccounted for water (UFW) by 20 percent. About half of the potential can 
be realized by altering the scale of operation. The regression results suggest that the 
length of distribution network and percentage of water connection metered are major 
determinants of performance of water utilities. 
 
The other one (Kumar and Managi, 2010) attempts to assess the impact of service 
quality on performance. Hours of water supply and pass rate of chlorine are 
considered indicators of quality in water service delivery. DEA is applied for 
measuring the performance of utilities under varying returns to scale. The results 
suggest that the performance of the utilities changes significantly when conventional 
quantity based measures are compared with quality adjusted measures. The study 
finds that sans quality, an average Indian urban water utility has the potential to 
increase the accounted for water by 47 percent, of which 22 percent can be 
attributed due to operating at optimal scales and rest could be due to emphasis on 
management considerations. But results with the inclusion of quality parameters 
suggest that the potential to increase the accounted for water is about 38 percent 
and 34 percent could be gained by operating at the optimal scale. 
 
From the review of above cited studies, it can be summarised that there is no clear-
cut evidence as to which type of ownership is superior over the other. The results are 
mixed in nature. In certain cases, it is observed that differences in results can be 
attributed to the different methods used for analysis. Therefore necessary caution 
must be taken while deciding a particular method for a particular situation. The 
present study extends the literature on efficiency and ownership of water utilities by 
measuring the technical efficiency of Indian water utilities. Although the Indian urban 
water supply system is not fully privatised, the utilities face differing levels of 
autonomy in management. 
 
 
IV. Methodology and Estimation 
 
The previous section explains the various techniques such as ordinary least square 
(OLS), SFA and DEA used in analyzing the efficiency of water industry in various 
countries. Though the OLS technique is easy to use and simple to interpret, it suffers 
from the problem of specifying the functional form for the production technology and 
unable to provide information on frontier performance. SFA though able to solve the 
latter problem by specifying a composed error term, splitting the error into two 10 
different parts as data noise term and error due to the inefficiency, it also suffers 
from the problem of specifying the functional form and requires specification about 
the distributional patterns of its composed error terms.  
 
This study uses the output oriented DEA technique which neither requires 
specification of the functional nor the distributional form of the error term. Although 
the major disadvantage of this approach is that it does not accommodate the effects 
of data noise, while OLS and SFA do so. DEA basically erects a production frontier 
consists of most relatively technically efficient municipalities in the sample. This 
process generates the technical efficiency measures for each unit in the sample by 
comparing observed values (the particular data point) to optimal values the best 
performing value) of outputs and inputs. The score of unity represent the best 
performing unit in the sample, and the score more than that implies that the unit or 
the service is not performing as well as its efficient peers. A rather interesting 
implication of DEA score is that, it also says that the how much more output could 
have been produced, if the given service could somehow emulate the production 
process of the efficient one, i.e., which is operating at the frontier of the production 
technology. The basic model of DEA can be briefly stated as follows. 
 
Output oriented measures of technical efficiency tell us how much more a water 
utility can produce from a given amount of resources. This can be illustrated with 
Figure 6. Suppose there are three water utilities producing two outputs, y1 and y2 
(lpcd and population served) and each using one input (revenue expenditure). 
Further assume that first two utilities are benchmark utilities; they are on the 
boundary or best practice frontier of the technology. Utility 3 employs the same 
quantities of the inputs as used by utilities 1 and 2, but produces less of both of the 
outputs, is in the interior of the output set, and obviously not as efficient (productive) 
as utilities 1 and 2.  If we measure the deviation of utility 3 from the best practice 
frontier in a radial way, its relative technical efficiency is given by ob/oa, which can 
also be thought of as a ratio of maximum potential output (at b) to observed (actual) 



























More formally it can be defined as follows: Technology of water utility can be 
specified either by production, cost or profit functions.  The output distance function 
generalises the production technology of a multi-output utility.  Assume that water 
utility employs a vector of inputs 
N
N R x x x    ) ,....., ( 1 such as revenue and water 
storage capacity (as a proxy for capital stock), etc. to produce a vector of outputs 
M
M R y y y    ) ,...., ( 1 such as lpcd, population served, etc, and then define the 
production technology of the water utility as 
 
}   produce can    : ) , {( y x y x T      (1) 
 
and the output distance function is defined as, 
 
  ] } / , inf[{ ) , ( T y x y x Do        (2) 
 
Equation (2) characterizes the output possibility set by the maximum equi-
proportional expansion of all outputs consistent with the technology set (1). Output 
distance function is non-decreasing, positively linearly homogeneous and convex in 
outputs and decreasing in inputs. The output distance function takes a value, which 
is less than or equal to one if the output vector is an element of the feasible 
production set. Furthermore, the distance function will take a value of unity if output 
vector is located on the outer boundary of the production possibility set. 
 
In computing the distance functions, we choose the DEA (or activity analysis) 
methodology among competing alternatives, so as to take advantage of the fact that 
the distance functions are reciprocals of Farrell efficiency measures. The DEA 
involves the use of linear programming methods to construct a piecewise linear 
envelopment frontier over the data points such that all observed points lie on or 
below the frontier. Thus, the technical efficiency for each firm is computed like this 
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   (3) 
 
where M is the number of outputs produced, N is the number of inputs employed, 
and K is the number of water utilities.  (z1,….., zk) are variables, which show the 
intensity with which each utility is used in order to construct the frontier of the 
production possibilities set.  In the formulation of equation (3), by restricting  0  k z , 
we imposed the condition of constant returns to scale (CRS). In the DEA, we can 
impose various kinds of returns to scale on reference technology by changing the 







1, then the technology 12 
satisfies the non-increasing returns to scale (NRS) and if the sum of intensity 
variable is restricted to exactly equal to one, we can model variable returns to scale 
(VRS) which allows increasing, constant and decreasing returns to scale.  
 
Technical inefficiency under CRS is the product of scale inefficiency and pure 
technical inefficiency. A water utility is operating under the condition of optimal 
returns to scale if the output oriented technical efficiency of a water utility is equal 
under CRS and VRS scenarios, otherwise it is scale inefficient. Deviations from 
scale efficiency are essentially deviations from CRS and therefore can be due to 
operating at a point of increasing or decreasing returns to scale. If the technical 
efficiency under CRS is not equal to the efficiency under VRS but the efficiency 
score under VRS and NRS are equal then the utility is operating under decreasing 
returns to scale (DRS). Finally, if the efficiency score are equal under CRS and NRS 
but less than VRS then the utility is operating in the range of increasing returns to 
scale (IRS) (Grosskopf, 1986; Kumar, 2006). 
 
 
V.  Data 
 
We include 27 cities in our analysis.  Though more than 60 CDPs are available, lack 
of availability of the required information limited us analyzing the efficiency of water 
utilities only for 27 cities with a fixed number of variables at a single point in time. 
The cities that are analysed are Agra, Ahmedabad, Amritsar, Bhopal, Bhubaneswar, 
Chandigarh, Coimbatore, Guwahati, Hyderabad, Indore, Itanagar, Ludhiana, 
Mathura, Meerut, Mumbai, Madurai, Mysore, Nagpur, Nanded, Nashik, Pune, 
Raipur, Rajkot, Surat, Vadodara, Vijayawada, and Visakhapatnam. The selection of 
inputs and outputs for the estimation of technical efficiency is based on the 
availability of data as well on the knowledge gained from the literature survey. The 
variables chosen for the present analysis are revenue expenditure (rupees/year), 
water production capacity, and water served
4. The first two variables are treated as 
inputs and total water served is used as output.  Table 1 provides descriptive 
statistics for the variables used in measuring performance and the cause of variation 
in performance. 
 
Some clarifications are required about the data used in the model. Revenue 
expenditures generally constitute recurring expenditures made on establishments, 
repairs and maintenance, debt servicing, etc. It is also imperative to mention that 
some other variables could have better served as input variable indicators, but 
unavailability of data does not allow us to include those relevant variables. On similar 
grounds, our analysis is limited in focusing only on single (total water served) output 
variable. Therefore, we analyze the model using the data on single output, total 
water served by a water utility as a function of revenue expenditures and water 






                                                 
4 Water served is defined as lpcd multiplied by the population of the city. 13 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Unit  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Max Min 
Revenue Expenditure 
Million 
Rupees 443.55  1037.10  5160.09  1.84 
Water Production 
Capacity  Million Litres 395.04  623.00  3100.00  1.80 
Llpcd of Water Supply  Litres  152.60  72.30  332.00  41.23 
Population Served  Percentage 74.15  23.70  100.00  27.00 
Total Water Supplied  Million Litres 345.45  599.80  3158.53  6.40 
Per Capita Revenue 
Expenditure  Rupees 179.34 183.82  676.65  11.60 
Storage Capacity  Million Litres 153.61 205.77  782.00  3.00 
 
We feel it merits mentioning here few points on the existing data inaccuracies and 
inconsistencies. The available data are not standardized across CDPs. For example, 
somewhere the units of water available are mentioned in MLD (Million Litres per 
Day), whereas in other CDPs it is in MGD (Million Gallons per Day) units. Further 
high degree of aggregation also handicapped us to restrict our analysis only at an 
aggregated level.  For example, for cities like Raipur and Coimbatore, the variable on 
revenue expenditure and all its sub-components are available but this is not the case 





Using the above data set, output oriented technical efficiency scorings are generated 
for the above-mentioned cities and are presented in Table 2. Recall that we are 
using output oriented measure of technical efficiency, therefore the efficiency scores 
greater than one implies that the utility has potential to increase its output for the 
given level of inputs. The efficiency estimates reveal that two cities, namely, Agra 
and Surat are operating at the frontier. These cities are also operating at the optimal 
scale of operation. In both of these cities the per capita revenue expenditure is 
lowest one (in Surat about Rs. 12 and in Agra about Rs. 20) and the lpcd is higher 
than the average. On the other hand, Mathura, Bhopal, Visakhapatnam, Nashik and 
Itanagar are the worst performing cities. These cities have the potential to increase 
the quantity of water supplied by three to eight times. For example Itanagar has 
highest per capita revenue expenditure and lpcd is just 137 litres. Similarly, Bhopal 
spent around the national average of per capita revenue expenditure but delivers 
only 88 litres of water on lpcd basis. The other cities have the potential to increase 
the desired output by some percentage to three times. The regression results in 
Table 4 also confirm there is a direct relationship between per capita revenue 
expenditure and technical inefficiency and an indirect association between technical 











Efficiency at CRS 
Bhubaneswar 1.074 1.080 1.160
Chandigarh 1.471 1.020 1.500
Raipur 1.025 1.600 1.640
Greater Mumbai  2.020 1.000 2.020
Rajkot 1.146 1.780 2.040
Nagpur 1.750 1.200 2.100
Pune 2.140 1.000 2.140
Ahmedabad 2.150 1.000 2.150
Vadodara 1.510 1.470 2.220
Vijayawada 1.455 1.560 2.270
Indore 1.660 1.530 2.540
Guwahati 2.930 1.000 2.930
Itanagar 3.210 1.000 3.210
Nashik 1.769 1.860 3.290





Average 1.69 1.32 2.23
Surat 1.000 1.000 1.000
Agra 1.000 1.000 1.000
Meerut 1.187 1.230 1.460
Amritsar 1.252 1.270 1.590
Nanded 1.073 1.920 2.060
Coimbatore 1.210 1.810 2.190
Ludhiana 1.779 1.310 2.330
Mysore 1.044 2.280 2.380
Madurai 1.016 2.480 2.520
Hyderabad (MCH) 1.849 1.460 2.700
Visakhapatnam 1.324 2.990 3.960




Average 1.20 1.82 2.20
Overall Average  1.43 1.55 2.21
Overall Average (without Mathura) 1.47 1.43 2.11
 
The overall average figures of scale inefficiencies reveal that the utilities are not 
utilizing their resources optimally. We find that Itanagar, Guwahati, Pune and 
Ahmedabad are most scale inefficient water utilities. These water utilities can 
improve their performance by changing the level of their operation.  If we consider 
Mathura as an outlier, still the overall average figures do not appear to improve 
significantly. 
 
Recall that technical efficiency is decomposed into scale efficiency and pure 
technical efficiency. Table 3 reveals the operating scale of different water utilities. 
The scale inefficiency results indicate that only two of the utilities are operating at the 
optimal scale and seven cities are operating under increasing returns to scale. But all 
the remaining cities, i.e., eighteen water utilities are operating under DRS. These 
results have implication for urban domestic water pricing. Generally, in the public 
utility pricing literature it is assumed that the utilities are operating under IRS and the 
marginal cost-pricing rule that ensures economic efficiency is not applied since the 15 
full cost is not recovered. These results support the idea that to get efficiency in the 
operation of water utilities the water should be priced according to the marginal cost 
of supply of the water.
5  It is contended that implementing the marginal cost pricing is 
cumbersome in India due to reasons like problems in using historical data, 
estimating external costs, apportioning joint costs and concerns related to equity 
aspect of water supply. Understanding the inherent difficulties in using marginal cost 
pricing, urban water in India is charged in many ways. A connection charge is 
imposed, which is a onetime levy, a tax and other rents are paid annually and other 
consumption charges are paid every month or at a pre-determined time (Mathur and 
Thakur, 2003). In contrast to the above observation made by the Mathur and Thakur 
(2003), our study asserts that data inadequacy could be managed by using the 
method suggested in this study and marginal cost pricing principle could be applied 
in the proposed cases.  
 
 
Table 3: Returns to scale for water utilities 
Returns to Scale  City 
Constant Returns to 
Scale (Optimal Returns 
to Scale) 
Surat and Agra  
Increasing Returns to 
Scale 
Raipur, Madurai, Mathura, Bhubaneswar, Nanded, 
Guwahati and Itanagar 
Decreasing Returns to 
Scale 
Chandigarh, Nagpur, Ahmedabad, Coimbatore, 
Vadodara, Vijayawada, Mysore, Hyderabad, Nashik, 
Bhopal, Visakhapatnam, Meerut, Amritsar, Greater 
Mumbai, Rajkot, Pune Itanagar, Ludhiana, Indore 
 
To explain the differential in inefficiency scores we classify the utilities according to 
their management structure. Although the public owns all the water utilities in India 
but they are managed by different agencies. Categorizing water utilities into different 
groups according to their management structure is not so easy as there is no clear-
cut division of responsibilities among the agencies involved in supplying water under 
the existing arrangements. In the utilities managed by Municipal Corporations, the 
municipal authorities themselves are responsible for managing all the activities of 
planning, designing, construction, implementation, maintenance, operation and 
management of water supply system. Similarly, the utilities, which are managed by 
Municipal Corporations and the Government, both the authorities, undertake all the 
activities with varying degrees of responsibility. In some cases, PHED does the 
capital work, the remaining task is undertaken by Municipal Corporations (e.g., 
Raipur), in others PHED is assigned to carry out most of the activities leaving very 
little to be done by the Municipal authorities (e.g., Bhopal and Indore). While in 
others, PHED is the leading agency to manage the water supply system of the city  
(e.g., Itanagar). Moreover, in some cities, there is some functional autonomy in the 
management of water utilities, i.e., Parastatal bodies managed the utilities (e.g., 
Hyderabad, Agra). In other cities water supply is the responsibility of both Parastatal 
and municipal bodies or are managed by all the three, i.e., PHED, municipal 
authorities and Parastatal bodies.  
                                                 
5 Whittington (2003) also observes that many South Asian cities are facing the situation of decreasing 
returns to scale in operation as they have to incur high costs to bring additional water into cities. 16 
 
Following this description, we split up the utilities into two groups as ‘Municipal 
Corporations and Government’ and ‘Municipal Corporations and Parastatals’. We 
have done it with the conviction that as both Municipal Corporations and State 
Government agencies are different layers of the government, it logically justifies 
putting them in one group. While making grouping of the water utilities, we assumed 
that there exists some degree of functional autonomy with the group ‘Municipal 
Corporations and Parastatals’. Therefore, we feel it is quite reasonable to put them 
into a separate category. 
 
Figure 7 shows the performance of water utilities according to their management 
structures. The overall technical inefficiency scores reveal that the water utilities run 
by the group ‘Municipal Corporations and Parastatals’ perform better than the other 





The decomposition of technical inefficiency results point that the utilities managed by 
‘Municipal Corporations and Parastatals’ have relatively better performance in terms 
of scale efficiency to the other group (Figure 7). But pure technical efficiency 
considerations reveal that utilities managed by ‘Municipal Corporations and 
Government’ perform better than the other group. The results presented in tables 2 
and 3 also indicate that the scale efficiency is clearly linked to the management of 
the utility although in both the groups utilities are operating under DRS and IRS.  
There are seven utilities, four within the group  ’Municipal Corporations and 
Government’, and three within the group ‘ Municipal Corporations and Parastatals’ 
that are operating under IRS.  Per se, the utilities operating under IRS are in small 
cities in comparison to other cities, and the variation in efficiency scores warrants 
more analysis. 
 
The issue of the type of ownerships and its implications for the performance of water 
utilities has been in debate with the publication of the seminal paper by the Crain and 
Zardkoohi (1978). Though the results are of mixed in nature, very often the 
techniques used for analyzing the efficiency are being questioned for its 
appropriateness and suitability. It must be mentioned here that though the pure form 17 
of privatization is yet to see the light of the day as a separate institution to provide 
water in urban India, it can be assumed that there exists some degree of corporate 
managerial discipline, in the group ‘Municipal Corporations’ and Parastatals’ Taking 
this as granted, our results corroborate with the results reached by the Crain and 
Zardkoohi, Bruggink (1982) Estache and Kouassi (2002). But our results are in 
contrast with the result achieved by the Feigenbaum and Teeples (1983) Byrnes et 
al. Grosskopf and Hayes (1986) Lambert and Dichev, (1993) Estache and Rossi 
(2000) Kirkpatrick et al. (2006) who conclude that there is no significant difference in 





Again, grouping cities on the basis of population, (population above 1.4 million in one 
group and rest in the other group as presented in the figure 8) our analysis confirms 
that less populated cities perform relatively better and have better overall technical 
efficiency scores. Moreover, decomposition of technical efficiency results suggests 
less populated cities are also more scale efficient in contrast to the other group, 
which performs better in terms of pure technical efficiency. 
 
One other issue of concern is to determine the factors underlying the changes in the 
various measures of efficiency. We expect that specific attributes of an individual 
utility contribute to its performance.  Therefore, to further aid an understanding of the 
results discussed above and to test the hypothesis whether function autonomy in 
management of utilities has affected the various measures of efficiency, we regress 
various measures of efficiency on utilities specific variables such as its management, 
water storage capacity etc. Tobit regression is often used with censored data and is 
suitable for analysis of efficiency scores. In the first equation the technical efficiency 
scores, in the second equation scale efficiency scores and in the third equation pure 
technical efficiency scores were taken as dependent variables. To examine the 
relationship between different measures of efficiency and their determinants, we 
included a dummy for management, i.e., 1 for the utilities where Parastatals, either 
completely or partially manage the utility and 0 for others, per capita per day water 
supplied (lpcd), per capita revenue expenditure, and water storage capacity of the 
utility.  18 
 
Table 4 provides the parameter estimates of the regressions for the inefficiency 
indices. The regression results show that three inefficiency indices are significantly 
affected by most of the independent variables. We find that the variables lpcd and 
per capita revenue expenditure affect the inefficiency indices negatively and 
positively respectively as expected in all the three regressions. It is expected that 
utilities that are providing higher lpcd and incur less per capita revenue expenditure 
are supposed to be less inefficient. The water storage capacity of the utilities 
increases the performance of water utilities, though the coefficient of water storage is 
not statistically significant for scale in-efficiency. 
 
The dummy variable signs are of particular interest and require some discussion. We 
find that the management variable is not statistically significant for all the three 
indices.  Water utilities with functional autonomy in management structure are scale 
efficient. But we find that the functional autonomy in management is not linked to 
technical efficiency of the utilities. Here it should be noted that most of the small 
cities such as Itanagar and Guwahati are managed by the government and municipal 
bodies, although the utilities are efficient in terms of pure technical efficiency, but 
they are not fully utilizing the economies of scale, i.e., they are facing downward 
sloping average and marginal costs curves. These cities are the case of pure natural 
monopoly where the water cannot be priced according to the principle of marginal 














Coefficient t-statistics  Coefficient  t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics 
Intercept 17.866
* 3.922 18.602
* 5.211  6.370
* 3.885 
Dummy for 
management 0.020  0.030  0.196  0.375  -0.822
* -4.046 
Log(lpcd)  -1.735
** -2.357  -1.283





** 1.936  0.779




* -3.577  -1.222
* -5.918  -0.062  -0.875 
Adj. R
2 0.315  0.05  0.272 
Log likelihood  -39.71  -32.11  -19.36 




                                                 
6 In the single product case: “a firm producing a single homogeneous product is a natural monopoly 
when it is less costly to produce any level of output of this product within a single firm than with two or 
more firms” (Joskow, 2005). This definition corresponds to the property of subadditivity of the cost 
function (Sharkey, 1982), which (in the single product case) is equivalent to economies of scale. 
Consequently, in the single product case, economies of scale are a sufficient but not necessary 
condition for natural monopoly (Joskow, 2005). 19 
VII. Conclusions 
 
The productivity of water utilities has been an important policy issue for a long time. 
This has assumed greater significance in the current context of reforms in the 
structure and functions of the utilities. This paper contributes to that debate by 
analyzing the impact of management on efficiency. 
 
The results of our analysis reveal some interesting insights and corroborate with 
studies carried out on similar lines by Crain and Zardkoohi, Bruggink (1982) Estache 
and Kouassi (2002). Grouping utilities under two management structures i.e. 
‘Municipal Corporations and Parastatals’ and ‘Municipal Corporations and 
Government’, our study establishes that the group ‘Municipal Corporation and 
Parastatals’ is performs better.  This supports the argument that management 
structures with some degree of corporate discipline are producing better outcomes. 
At the same time our study finds contrasting evidence to Feigenbaum and Teeples 
(1983), Byrnes et. al (1986), Lambert and Dichev (1993), Estache and Rossi (2000) 
and Kirkpatrick et al. (2006) who conclude there is no significant difference in 
performance between private and public operators in supplying water. 
 
Our results also have implications for the pricing of water. The offshoot of our 
analysis suggests that as most of cities are operating under decreasing returns to 
scale, marginal cost pricing principles can be followed. This is in contrast to the 
common pricing practice of utilities having the character of natural monopoly.  
 
Therefore it can be concluded from our analysis that though it is difficult to make a 
clear cut segmentation of the institutions into private and public, nevertheless 
assuming a certain degree of functional autonomy element that inherently exist in  
parastatal bodies, our study affirms that functional autonomy may have the potential 
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